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HE term "Washington Consensus" was coined in 1989. The first
written usage was in my background paper for a conference that
the Institute for International Economics convened in order to ex-
amine the extent to which the old ideas of development economics that
had governed Latin American economic policy since the 1950s were be-
ing swept aside by the set of ideas that had long been accepted as appro-
priate within the OECD. In order to try and ensure that the background
papers for that conference dealt with a common set of issues, I made a list
of ten policies that I thought more or less everyone in Washington would
agree were needed more or less everywhere in Latin America, and la-
beled this the "Washington Consensus." Little did it occur to me that
fifteen years later I would be asked to write about the history of a term
that had become the center of fierce ideological controversy.
The first section of this paper describes what I recollect about the back-
ground to my background paper for the 1989 conference. The second
section retraces much more familiar ground, summarizing the ten points
that I included in the Washington Consensus. This is followed by an ac-
count of the reception given to the term, and the analysis. The next sec-
tion tries to account for the fact that the term became used in such
different ways in different quarters and thus to be at the center of ideo-
logical controversies. The last substantive section is forward-looking and
describes what I believe needs to be added to my original list in order to
formulate a policy agenda for Latin America today.
BACKGROUND
The story started in the Spring of 1989 when I was testifying before a
Congressional committee in favor of the Brady Plan. I argued that it
* Senior Fellow, Institute for International Economics
1. Paper commissioned by Fundaci6n CIDOB for a conference "From the Washing-
ton Consensus towards a new Global Governance," Barcelona, September 24-25,
2004. The paper is reprinted with the permission of the Peter G. Peterson Institute
for International Economics which owns the copyright rights of all of its fellows.
The institute is a private, nonpartisan, institution devoted to the study of economic
policy and is one of the only economic think tanks considered to be "nonpartisan"
by the press and "neutral" by the U.S. Congress.
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would be good policy to help the debtor countries overcome their debt
burden now that they were making profound changes in economic policy,
along the lines advocated by Balassa, Bueno, Kuczynski, and Simonsen
(1986). I encountered rank disbelief in the Congressmen before whom I
was testifying that there were any significant changes in economic policies
and attitudes in process in Latin America. After discussion with Fred
Bergsten, the director at the Institute for International Economics, where
I was (and am) professionally located, we decided to convene a confer-
ence to test the extent to which I was right and to put the change in policy
attitudes on the record in Washington.
A few weeks later I gave a seminar at the Institute for Development
Studies in England, where I made much the same argument. I was chal-
lenged by Hans Singer to spell out what I meant when I said that many of
the countries were changing their policies for the better. This emphasized
the need to be very explicit about the policy changes that I was thinking
of. I decided that conference that we were planning for the autumn,
which we decided to call "Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has
Happened?" needed a background paper that would spell out the sub-
stance of the policy changes we were interested in. That paper was enti-
tled "What Washington Means by Policy Reform" and was sent to the ten
authors who had agreed to write country studies for our conference to try
and make sure that they addressed a common set of issues in their papers.
That paper said inter alia on its opening page:
Th[is] paper identifies and discusses 10 policy instruments about
whose proper deployment Washington can muster a reasonable de-
gree of consensus... .The paper is intended to elicit comment on both
the extent to which the views identified do indeed command a con-
sensus and on whether they deserve to command it. It is hoped that
the country studies to be guided by this background paper will com-
ment on the extent to which the Washington consensus is shared in
the country in question....
The Washington of this paper is both the political Washington of
Congress and senior members of the administration and the techno-
cratic Washington of the international financial institutions, the eco-
nomic agencies of the U.S. government, the Federal Reserve Board,
and the think tanks. The Institute for International Economics made
a contribution to codifying and propagating several aspects of the
Washington consensus in its publication Toward Renewed Economic
Growth in Latin America (Balassa et al. 1986).
My opinion at that time was that views had pretty much coalesced on
the sort of policies that had long been advocated by the OECD. I specifi-
cally did not believe that most of the "neoliberal" innovations2 of the
Reagan administration in the United States or the Thatcher government
2. I use the word "neoliberalism" in its origin sense, to refer to the doctrines es-
poused by the Mont Pelerin Society. If there is another definition, I would love to
hear what it is so that I can decide whether neo liberalism is more than an intellec-
tual swear word.
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in Britain had survived the demise of the former (Mrs. Thatcher's govern-
ment was still in its death throes at the time). The exception was priva-
tization, which was Mrs. Thatcher's personal gift to the economic policy
agenda of the world, and which by 1989 had proved its worth. But I
thought all the other new ideas with which Reagan and Thatcher had
entered office, notably monetarism, supply-side economics, and minimal
government, had by then been discarded as impractical or undesirable
fads, so no trace of them can be found in what I labeled the "Washington
Consensus." Of course, acceptance as relevant to the developing world
of ideas that had long been motherhood and apple pie in the developed
world was a momentous change.
All through the Cold War the world had remained frozen in the 1950s'
classification of First, Second, and Third Worlds, each of which was as-
sumed to have its own distinct set of economic laws. 1989 marked the end
of the Second World, to the great relief of most of its subjects, and also
the end of the intellectual apartheid that had so long assumed that citi-
zens of the Third World behaved quite differently to those of the First
World. But the globalization of knowledge never meant general accept-
ance of neoliberalism by any definition I know of.
CONTENT OF THE ORIGINAL LIST
The ten reforms that constituted my list were as follows:
1. Fiscal Discipline. This was in the context of a region where al-
most all countries had run large deficits that led to balance of pay-
ments crises and high inflation that hit mainly the poor because the
rich could park their money abroad.
2. Reordering Public Expenditure Priorities. This suggested
switching expenditure in a pro-growth and pro-poor way, from things
like non-merit subsidies to basic health and education and infrastruc-
ture. It did not call for all the burden of achieving fiscal discipline to
be placed on expenditure cuts; on the contrary, the intention was to
be strictly neutral about the desirable size of the public sector, an
issue on which even a hopeless consensus-seeker like me did not im-
agine that the battle had been resolved with the end of history that
was being promulgated at the time.
3. Tax Reform. The aim was a tax system that would combine a
broad tax base with moderate marginal tax rates.
4. Liberalizing Interest Rates. In retrospect I wish I had formu-
lated this in a broader way as financial liberalization, stressed that
views differed on how fast it should be achieved, and-especially-
recognized the importance of accompanying financial liberalization
with prudential supervision.
5. A Competitive Exchange Rate3 . I fear I indulged in wishful
3. I have seen it asserted that a competitive exchange rate is the same as an underval-
ued rate. Not so; a competitive rate is a rate that is not overvalued, i.e. that is
either undervalued or correctly valued. My fifth point reflects a conviction that
overvalued exchange rates are worse than unvalued rates, but a rate that is neither
overvalued nor undervalued is better still.
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thinking in asserting that there was a consensus in favor of ensuring
that the exchange rate would be competitive, which pretty much im-
plies an intermediate regime; in fact Washington was already begin-
ning to edge toward the two-corner doctrine which holds that a
country must either fix firmly or else it must float "cleanly".
6. Trade Liberalization. I acknowledged that there was a differ-
ence of view about how fast trade should be liberalized, but every-
one agreed that was the appropriate direction in which to move.
7. Liberalization of Inward Foreign Direct Investment. I specifi-
cally did not include comprehensive capital account liberalization,
because I did not believe that did or should command a consensus in
Washington.
8. Privatization. As noted already, this was the one area in which
what originated as a neoliberal idea had won broad acceptance. We
have since been made very conscious that it matters a lot how priva-
tization is done: it can be a highly corrupt process that transfers as-
sets to a privileged elite for a fraction of their true value, but the
evidence is that it brings benefits (especially in terms of improved
service coverage) when done properly, and the privatized enterprise
either sells into a competitive market or is properly regulated.
9. Deregulation. This focused specifically on easing barriers to en-
try and exit, not on abolishing regulations designed for safety or en-
vironmental reasons, or to govern prices in a non-competitive
industry.
10. Property Rights. This was primarily about providing the infor-
mal sector with the ability to gain property rights at acceptable cost
(inspired by Hernando de Soto's analysis).
FIRST REACTIONS
The three American discussants whom I had invited to react to my pa-
per were Richard Feinberg (then at the Overseas Development Council),
Stanley Fischer (then Chief Economist at the World Bank), and Allan
Meltzer (then as now a professor at Carnegie- Mellon University). Fein-
berg and Meltzer were intended to make sure that I had not represented
as consensual anything that one or other side of the political spectrum
would regard as rubbish, while Fischer would play the same safeguard
role as regards the IFIs. Fischer was most supportive of the basic thrust of
the paper, saying that "there are no longer two competing economic de-
velopment paradigms" and that "Williamson has captured the growing
Washington consensus on what the developing countries should do." But
he pointed to some areas that I had not commented on and where sharp
disagreements remained, such as the environment, military spending, a
need for more comprehensive financial reform than freeing interest rates,
bringing back flight capital, and freeing flows of financial capital.4 It was
4. Interestingly, in the light of his position when first deputy managing director of the
IMF, he wrote: "I fear rather that much of Washington does believe strongly that
financial capital flows should not be constrained, but that it has simply not yet
focused on the problem."
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not my intent to argue that controversy had ended, so I would not take
issue with his contention that there remained sharp disagreements on a
number of issues (including the desirability of capital account liberaliza-
tion). And my initial paper did indeed formulate the financial liberaliza-
tion question too narrowly.
Meltzer expressed his pleasure at finding how much the mainstream
had learned (according to my account) about the futility of things like
policy activism, exploiting the unemployment/inflation tradeoff, and de-
velopment planning. The two elements of my list on which he concen-
trated his criticism were once again the interest rate question (though
here he focused more on my interim objective of a positive but moderate
real interest rate than on the long run objective of interest rate liberaliza-
tion) and a competitive exchange rate. The criticism of the interest rate
objective I regard as merited. His alternative to a competitive exchange
rate, namely a currency board, would certainly not be consensual, but the
fact that he raised this issue was my first warning that on the exchange
rate question I had misrepresented the degree of agreement in
Washington.
Feinberg started off by suggesting that there really was not much of a
consensus at all, but his comment mellowed as it progressed, and he con-
cluded by saying that there was convergence on key concepts though still
plenty to argue about. His most memorable line does not appear in his
written comment but consisted of the suggestion that I should have la-
beled my list the Universal Convergence rather than the Washington
Consensus, since the extent of agreement is far short of consensus but
runs far wider than Washington. He was of course correct on both points,
but it was too late to change the terminology.
The point about how much more apt it would have been to refer to a
universal convergence rather than a Washington consensus was rubbed
home in a fourth comment, by Patricio Meller of CIEPLAN in Santiago
de Chile.
In the months that followed I participated in several meetings where I
not only argued that the policies included in my ten points were in fact
being adopted fairly widely in Latin America, as our conference had con-
firmed, but also that this was a good thing and that lagging countries
should catch up. I know that I never regarded those ten points as consti-
tuting the whole of what should be on the policy agenda, but perhaps I
was not always as careful in spelling that out as I should have been.
The two points in my original list that seem to me in retrospect least
adequate as a summary of conventional thinking are the two identified by
Allan Meltzer, namely financial liberalization and exchange-rate policy.
The agenda for financial liberalization went broader than interest rates,
to include most importantly the liberalization of credit flows, and (as Joe
Stiglitz has often pointed out) it needed to be supplemented by pruden-
tial supervision if it were not to lead almost inexorably to financial crisis.
We already had the experience of the Southern Cone liberalization of the
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late 1970s to emphasize that point, so I clearly should not have over-
looked it. On exchange rate policy I fear I was guilty of wishful thinking
in suggesting that opinion had coalesced on something close to my own
view, whereas in fact I suspect that even then a majority of Washington
opinion would have plumped for either the bipolar view or else (like
Meltzer) one of the poles.
In arguing that lagging countries should catch up with the policy re-
forms on my list, I argued on occasion that the East Asian NICs had
broadly followed those policies. A Korean discussant (whose name I re-
gret to say escapes me) at a conference in Madison challenged this con-
tention; he argued that their macro policies had indeed been prudent, but
also asserted (like Alice Amsden and Robert Wade) that their
microeconomic policies had involved an active role for the state quite at
variance with the thrust of points 4 and 69 of my list. I think one has to
concede that some of the East Asian countries, notably Korea and Tai-
wan, were far from pursuing laissez-faire during their years of catch-up
growth, but this does not prove that their rapid growth was attributable to
their departure from liberal policies, as critics of the Washington Consen-
sus seem to assume axiomatically. There were after all two other East
Asian countries that grew comparably rapidly, in which the state played a
much smaller role. Indeed, one of those-namely Hong Kong-was the
closest to a model of laissez-faire that the world has ever seen. It would
seem to me more natural to attribute the fast growth of the East Asian
NICs to what they had in common, such as fiscal prudence, high savings
rates, work ethic, competitive exchange rates, and a focus on education,
rather than to what they did differently, such as industrial policy, directed
credit, and import protection.
Incidentally, one should compare the policy stance of Korea and Tai-
wan with that of other developing countries, not with a textbook model of
perfect competition. Most of the countries that failed to grow compara-
bly fast were even less liberal. So even if it was wrong to treat the East
Asian NICs as pin-up examples of the Washington Consensus in action, it
is even more misleading to treat them as evidence for rejecting
microeconomic liberalization. That controversy cannot be resolved by
any simple appeal to what happened in East Asia.
But arguments about the content of the Washington Consensus have
always been secondary to the wave of indignation unleashed by the name
that I pinned on this list of policy reforms. Some of the reformers obvi-
ously believed that I had undercut their local standing by calling it a
"Washington" agenda, and thus suggesting that these were reforms that
were being imposed on them rather than being adopted at their own voli-
tion because they recognized that those were the reforms their country
needed. When I invented the term I was not thinking of making propa-
ganda for economic reform (insofar as I was contemplating making prop-
aganda, it was propaganda for debt relief in Washington, not propaganda
for policy reform in Latin America). From the standpoint of making
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propaganda for policy reform in Latin America, Mois6s Nafm (2000) has
argued that in fact it was a good term in 1989, the year the coalition led
by the United States emerged victorious in the Cold War, when people
were searching for a new ideology and the ideology of the victors looked
rather appealing. But it was a questionable choice in more normal times,
and a terrible one in the world that George W. Bush has created, where
mention of Washington is hardly the way to curry support from non-
Americans. It was, I fear, a propaganda gift to the old left.
VARYING INTERPRETATIONS
To judge by the sales of Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has
Happened? , the vast majority of those who have launched venomous
attacks on the Washington Consensus have not read my account of what I
meant by the term. When I read what others mean by it, I discover that it
has been interpreted to mean bashing the state, a new imperialism, the
creation of a laissez-faire global economy, that the only thing that matters
is the growth of GDP, and doubtless much else besides. I submit that it is
difficult to find any of these implied by the list of ten policy reforms that I
presented earlier.
One event that I found extraordinary was to learn that many people in
Latin America blamed the adoption of Washington Consensus policies
for the collapse of the Argentine economy in 2001. I found this extraordi-
nary because I had for some years been hoping against hope that Argen-
tina would not suffer a collapse like the one that occurred, but was
nonetheless driven to the conclusion that it was highly likely because of
the fundamental ways in which the country had strayed from two of the
most basic precepts of what I had laid out. Specifically, it had adopted a
fixed exchange rate that became chronically overvalued (for reasons that
were not its fault at all, let me add), and-while its fiscal deficits were
smaller than in the 1980s-it had not used its boom years to work down
the debt/GDP ratio. Its fiscal policy as the crisis approached was not
nearly restrictive enough to sustain the currency board system. None of
the good reforms along Washington Consensus lines that Argentina had
indeed made during the 1990s-trade liberalization, financial liberaliza-
tion, privatization, and so on-seemed to me to have the slightest bearing
on the crisis. Yet Latin American populists and journalists, and even a
few reputable economists, were asserting that the Washington Consensus
was somehow to blame for the Argentinean implosion. I am still hoping
to learn the causal channel they have in mind.
One has to conclude that the term has been used to mean very differ-
ent things by different people. In fact, it seems to me that there are at
least two interpretations of the term beside mine that are in widespread
circulation.
One uses it to refer to the policies the Bretton Woods institutions ap-
plied toward their client countries, or perhaps the attitude of the US gov-
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ernment plus the Bretton Woods institutions. 5 This seems to me a
reasonable, well-defined usage. In the early days after 1989 there was not
much difference between my concept and this one, but over time some
substantive differences emerged. The Bretton Woods institutions increas-
ingly came to espouse the so-called bipolar doctrine (at least until the
implosion of the Argentine economy in 2001, as a direct result of applying
one of the supposedly crisis-free regimes), according to which countries
should either float their exchange rate "cleanly" or else fix it firmly by
adopting some institutional device like a currency board. As pointed out
above, that is directly counter to my version of the Washington Consen-
sus, which called for a competitive exchange rate, which necessarily im-
plies an intermediate regime since either fixed or floating rates can easily
become overvalued. Again, the Bretton Woods institutions, or at least the
IMF, came in the mid-1990s to urge countries to liberalize their capital
accounts, whereas my version had deliberately limited the call for liberali-
zation of capital flows to FDI. Both of those deviations from the original
version were in my opinion terrible, with the second one bearing the ma-
jor responsibility for causing the Asian crisis of 1997. But there were also
some highly positive differences, as the Bank and Fund came to take up
some of the issues that I had not judged sufficiently major in Latin
America in 1989 to justify inclusion. I think in particular of institutional
issues, especially regarding governance and corruption, in the case of the
Bank, and financial sector reform as reflected in standards and codes in
the case of the Fund. And by the late 1990s both institutions had replaced
their earlier indifference to issues of income distribution by a recognition
that it matters profoundly who gains or loses income.
The third interpretation of the term "Washington Consensus" uses it as
a synonym for neoliberalism or market fundamentalism. This I regard as
a thoroughly objectionable perversion of the original meaning. Whatever
else the term "Washington Consensus" may mean, it should surely refer
to a set of policies that command or commanded a consensus in some
significant part of Washington, either the US government or the IFIs or
both, or perhaps both plus some other group. Even in the early years of
the Reagan administration, or during Bush 43, it would be difficult to
contend that any of the distinctively neoliberal policies, such as supply-
side economics, monetarism, or minimal government, commanded much
of a consensus, certainly not in the IFIs. And it would be preposterous to
associate any of those policies with the Clinton administration. Yet most
of the political diatribes against the Washington Consensus have been di-
5. For years I was oblivious to the obvious interpretation; I owe my enlightenment to
Yaw Ansu of the World Bank. The fact that this usage is widespread was brought
home to me vividly at the conference in Havana earlier this year. In my presenta-
tion to the conference I thought I had gone to pains to distinguish three concepts:
my original one and the two variants described in the text. When my presentation
was summarized by Fidel Castro, he told the assembled throng that Williamson
had said he disagreed with the Washington Consensus in two ways, naming the
ways (exchange rate policy and capital account liberalization) in which I had said
that this version was inferior to mine!
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rected against this third concept, with those using the term this way ap-
parently unconcerned with the need to establish that there actually was a
consensus in favor of the policies they love to hate.6
Why should the term have come to be used in such different ways? I
find it easy enough to see why the second usage emerged. The term ini-
tially provided a reasonable description of the policies of the Bretton
Woods institutions, and as these evolved the term continued to refer to
what these currently were.
What puzzles me is how the third usage became so popular. The only
hypothesis that has ever seemed to me remotely plausible is that this was
an attempt to discredit economic reform by bundling a raft of ideas that
deserve to be consigned to oblivion along with the list of commonsense
pro-reform proposals that constituted my original list. This was doubtless
facilitated by the name that I had bestowed on my list, which gave an
incentive to anyone who disliked the policies or attitudes of the US gov-
ernment or the IFIs to join in a misrepresentation of the policies they
were promoting.
In any event, surely intellectual integrity demands a conscientious at-
tempt in the future to distinguish alternative concepts of the Washington
Consensus. Semantic issues may not be the most exciting ones, but being
clear about the way in which terms are being used is a necessary condi-
tion for serious professional discussion. The practice of dismissing re-
quests for clarification as tedious pedantry should be unacceptable.
Perhaps then more critics would follow the example of the Korean discus-
sant to whom I referred earlier who laid out precisely which elements of
my original agenda he objected to. Or if a critic chooses to use the third
concept, then surely he should say that he is talking about a concept of
the Washington Consensus that has never commanded a consensus in
Washington.
THE FUTURE
However much exception I may take to some of the assaults that have
been made on the Washington Consensus, I have to admit that I too am
uncomfortable if it is interpreted as a comprehensive agenda for eco-
nomic reform. Even in 1989, there was one objective of economic policy
that I regard as of major importance but that found only very tenuous
reflection in the Consensus.7 Since then fifteen years have passed, and it
6. I find it ironic that one of the chairman of President Clinton's Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors should have adopted this usage, since my understanding of the
definition of the word consensus would preclude a Washington Consensus includ-
ing anything to which he serious objection while in office as either chairman of the
U.S. Council of Economic Advisors or Economist at the World Bank.
7. I am referring to equity, which did not play a larger role because I regret to say
that I could not convince myself that the Washington of 1989 (or 2004, for that
matter) agreed that equity was of any consequence. The one respect in which it
did appear was in the second point, which said that public expenditure should be
redirected from non-merit subsidies, defense, and administration toward things
like primary education, health and infrastructure that would be both pro-growth
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would be remarkable (and depressing) if no new ideas worthy of inclu-
sion in the policy agenda had emerged. Hence there are two reasons why
my policy agenda of today can differ from the Washington Consensus as I
laid it out in 1989: because I am not limiting myself to doctrines able to
command a consensus but am presenting what I believe deserves to be
done, and because time has passed and ideas have developed.
A book that I co-edited last year (Kuczynski and Williamson 2003) ad-
dressed the issue of delineating a policy agenda appropriate for Latin
America in the current decade. Note that this new agenda, like the origi-
nal Washington Consensus, was aimed specifically at Latin America at a
particular moment of history, rather than claiming to be a text for all
countries at all times as many critics have interpreted it to be. We identi-
fied four major topics that ought to be included.
The first of these is stabilization policy. The need for more pro-active
policies to keep the economy on an even keel has been driven home with
great force in recent years by the horrifying price that many emerging
markets have paid for the crises to which so many have been exposed.
When I drew up the Washington Consensus the overwhelming need, at
least in Latin America, was to conquer inflation, so that was the
macroeconomic objective that I emphasized. Had it occurred to me that
my list would be regarded in some quarters as a comprehensive blueprint
for policy practitioners, I hope that I would have added the need for poli-
cies designed to crisis-proof economies and stabilize them against the
business cycle (the sort of measures that Ricardo French-Davis has advo-
cated under the heading of "reforming the reforms").
A first implication is to use fiscal policy as a countercyclical tool, inso-
far as possible. The most effective way to do this seems to be to
strengthen the automatic stabilizers and let them operate. (It seems un-
likely that emerging markets would have more success with discretionary
fiscal policy than the developed countries have had.) Most developing
countries have been precluded from doing even this by a need to keep the
markets happy, which has required deflationary fiscal policy during diffi-
cult times. The way to end this is to use booms to work down debt levels
to a point at which the market will consider them creditworthy, which
means that countercyclical fiscal policy can be initiated only during the
boom phase of the cycle.
Obviously there are other tools besides fiscal policy that may help min-
imize the probability of encountering a crisis, and its cost if it nevertheless
occurs. Exchange rate policy may be the most crucial, since many of the
emerging-market crises of recent years have originated in the attempt to
defend a more-or-less fixed exchange rate. For this reason most countries
have abandoned the use of fixed or predetermined exchange rates in
favor of some version of floating. However, there is still an important
difference of view between those who think of floating as implying a com-
and pro-equity. This doctrine, that had by then become well-established in the
World Bank.
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mitment on the part of the government not to think about what exchange
rate is appropriate, versus those who take the view that floating is simply
avoidance of a commitment to defend a particular margin.
In the latter view, which I share, it is still perfectly appropriate for a
government to have a view on what range of rates would be appropriate,
and to slant policy with a view to pushing the rate toward that range, even
if it avoids guaranteeing that the rate will stay within some defined mar-
gins. In particular, I would argue that while a government should freely
allow depreciation in order to avoid or limit the damage of a crisis, it
should if necessary be proactive in seeking to limit appreciation in good
times, when investors are pushing in money. If a country has a suffi-
ciently efficient and uncorrupt civil service to be able to make capital
controls (like the Chilean uncompensated reserve requirement of the
1990s) work (and not all countries do!), then it should be prepared if
necessary to use capital controls to limit the inflow of foreign funds and
hence help maintain a competitive exchange rate.
Monetary policy is also highly pertinent to countercyclical policy.
Many countries, especially those that have abandoned a fixed exchange
rate and were therefore seeking a new nominal anchor, have told their
central bank to use an inflation targeting framework to guide monetary
policy. This appears a sensible choice, provided at least that it is not in-
terpreted so rigidly as to preclude some regard for the state of the real
economy when setting monetary policy.
Recent experience has demonstrated conclusively that the severity of a
crisis is magnified when a country has a large volume of debt denomi-
nated in foreign exchange (see e.g. Goldstein and Turner 2004). This is
because currency depreciation, which does-and should-occur when a
crisis develops, increases the real value of the debts of those who have
their obligations denominated in foreign currency. If the banks took the
exchange risk by borrowing in foreign currency and on-lending in local
currency, then their solvency will be threatened directly. If they sought to
avoid that risk by on-lending in foreign currency, then their debtors' fi-
nancial position will be undermined (especially if they are in the non-
tradable sector), and the banks are likely to end up with a large volume of
bad loans, which may also threaten their solvency. If the government
contracted foreign currency debt (or allowed the private sector to shield
itself by unloading its foreign currency debt when conditions turned
threatening), then the effect of a currency depreciation will be to increase
public-sector debt and thereby undermine confidence at a critical time.
Whatever the form of such borrowing, it can intensify any difficulties that
may emerge.
The solution is to curb borrowing in foreign currency. The government
can perfectly well just say no when deciding the currency composition of
its own borrowing and issue bonds in local currency (as more and more
emerging markets are now starting to do). Bank supervision can be used
to discourage bank borrowing, and lending, in foreign exchange. The
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more difficult issue is foreign-currency borrowing by corporations. To
prevent that would require the imposition of controls on the form of for-
eign borrowing. Perhaps it makes more sense to content oneself with
discouraging, rather than completely preventing, foreign cur-
rency-denominated borrowing. That could be achieved by taxation pol-
icy, which could give less tax relief for interest payments on foreign-
currency loans, and/or charge higher taxes on interest receipts on such
loans.
Obviously crisis-proofing an economy may require attention to other
issues. For example, in many countries subnational government units
face a soft budget constraint, which for well-known reasons is not good
for stabilization policy. But the purpose of this section is to give an idea
of the issues that are important in designing a policy agenda, not to write
a comprehensive account of every issue that may face a policy practi-
tioner, so I will leave this first issue.
The second general heading of our policy agenda consisted of pushing
on with the liberalizing reforms that were embodied in the original Wash-
ington Consensus, and extending them to areas like the labor market
where economic performance is being held back by excessive rigidity.
One does not have to be some sort of market fundamentalist who be-
lieves that less government is better government and that externalities
can safely be disregarded in order to recognize the benefits of using mar-
ket forces to coordinate activity and motivate effort. This proposition is
such a basic part of economic thinking that it is actually rather difficult to
think of a work that conclusively establishes its truth. But there are a
variety of indirect confirmations, from the universal acclaim that meets
the abandonment of rationing to the success of emissions trading in re-
ducing pollution at far lower cost than was anticipated.
It is certainly true that the move to adopt a more liberal policy stance
in many developing countries over the past two decades has as yet had
the hoped-for effect of stimulating growth in only a few countries, like
India. The results have not been comparably encouraging in, say, Latin
America (Ocampo 2004, Kuczynski and Williamson 2003). But the blame
for this seems to me to lie in the misguided macroeconomic policies-like
allowing exchange rates to become overvalued and making no attempt to
stabilize the cycle-that accompanied the microeconomic reforms, rather
than in the latter themselves. The same was true in the United Kingdom
under Mrs. Thatcher and in New Zealand when Roger Douglas was fi-
nance minister; both undertook far-reaching microeconomic liberaliza-
tions that can now be seen to have arrested and even reversed the relative
decline of those countries, but their peoples saw no benefits for the best
part of a decade because of the primitive macro policies that accompa-
nied the micro reform.
When we asked what is today most in need of liberalization in Latin
America, we concluded that it is the labor market. Around 50 percent of
the labor force in many Latin American countries is in the informal sec-
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tor. This means that they do not enjoy even the most basic social bene-
fits, like health insurance, some form of safeguard against unemployment,
and the right to a pension in old age. What people do get is the right to
maintain through thick and thin a formal-sector job if they are lucky
enough to have one, and a wide range of social benefits that go along with
all formal-sector jobs. Not all these benefits appear to be highly valued,
to judge by the stories of workers taking second jobs to supplement what
they can earn in their guaranteed maximum of 40 hours, or taking an-
other job during their guaranteed summer vacations. So we proposed to
flexibilize firing for good reason and curtail the obligation to pay those
elements of the social wage that appear less appreciated, in the belief that
this will reduce the cost of employing labor in the formal sector and so
lead to more hiring and greater efficiency. There is an abundant eco-
nomic literature that concludes that the net effect of making it easier to
fire workers is to increase employment net.
The third element of our proposed policy agenda consists of building or
strengthening institutions. This is hardly novel; the importance of institu-
tion building has in fact become the main new thrust of development eco-
nomics in the 15 years since the Washington Consensus was first
promulgated. Which particular institutions are most in need of strength-
ening tends to vary from one country to another, so the possibility of
generalizing is limited, but archaic judiciaries, rigid civil service bureau-
cracies, old- fashioned political systems, teachers' unions focused exclu-
sively on producer interests, and weak financial infrastructures are all
common. need of strengthening tends to vary from one country to an-
other, so the possibility of generalizing is limited, but archaic judiciaries,
rigid civil service bureaucracies, old- fashioned political systems, teachers'
unions focused exclusively on producer interests, and weak financial in-
frastructures are all common.
One institutional reform that we certainly did not advocate was intro-
duction of industrial policy, meaning by this a program that requires some
government agency to "pick winners" (to help companies that are judged
likely to be able to contribute something special to the national econ-
omy). As argued before, there is little reason to think that industrial poli-
cies were the key ingredient of success in East Asia (see also Noland and
Pack 2003). But we did have a lot more sympathy for a cousin of indus-
trial policy usually referred to as a national innovation system. This does
not require government to start making business judgments; it instead has
government seek to create an institutional environment in which those
firms that want to innovate find the necessary supporting infrastructure.
A national innovation system is about government creating institutions to
provide technical education, to promote the diffusion of technological in-
formation, to fund precompetitive research, to provide tax incentives for
R&D, to encourage venture capital, to stimulate the growth of industrial
clusters, and so on. While there is still ample scope for productivity to
increase in Latin America by copying best practices developed in the rest
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of the world, it may need an act of Schumpeterian innovation-and
therefore the sort of technologically supportive infrastructure that com-
prises a national innovation system-to bring world best practice to Latin
America (ECLAC 1995, part 2).
The final element of the policy agenda is intended to combat the neg-
lect of equity that was as true of the Washington Consensus as it has long
been of economics in general. We suggested that it is important for gov-
ernments to target an improved distribution of income in the same way
that they target a higher rate of growth. Where there are opportunities
for win-win solutions that will both increase growth and improve income
distribution (such as, maybe, redirecting public education subsidies from
universities to primary schools), they should be exploited. But the more
fundamental point is that there is no intellectual justification for arguing
that only win-win solutions deserve to be considered. One always needs
to be aware of the potential cost in terms of efficiency (or growth) of
actions to improve income distribution, but in a highly unequal region
like Latin America opportunities for making large distributive gains for
modest efficiency costs deserve to be seized.
Progressive taxes are the classic instrument for redistributing income.
One of the more questionable aspects of the reforms of the past decade in
Latin America has been the form that tax reform has tended to take, with
a shift in the burden of taxation from income taxes (which are typically at
least mildly progressive) to consumption taxes (which are usually at least
mildly regressive). While the tax reforms that have occurred have been
useful in developing a broader tax base, it is time to reverse the process of
shifting from direct to indirect taxation; effort should now focus on in-
creasing direct tax collections. For incentive reasons one may want to
avoid increasing the marginal tax rate on earned income, but that still
leaves at least three possibilities:
* The development of property taxation as a major revenue source (it
is the most natural revenue source for the subnational government
units that are being spawned by the process of decentralization that has
rightly become so popular).
* The elimination of tax loopholes, not only so as to increase revenue
but also to simplify tax obligations and thus aid enforcement.
* Better tax collection, particularly of the income earned on flight
capital parked abroad, which will require the signing of tax informa-
tion-sharing arrangements with at least the principal havens for capital
flight.
Increased tax revenue needs to be used to increase spending on basic
social services, including a social safety net as well as education and
health, so that the net effect will be a significant impact in terms of reduc-
ing inequality, particularly by expanding opportunities for the poor.
With the best will in the world, however, what is achievable through
the tax system is limited, in part by the fact that one of the things that
money is good at buying is advice on how to minimize a tax bill. Really
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significant improvements in distribution will come only by remedying the
fundamental weakness that causes poverty, which is that too many people
lack the assets that enable them to work their way out of poverty. The
basic principle of a market economy is that people exchange like value
for like value. Hence in order to earn a decent living the poor must have
the opportunity to offer something that others want and will pay to buy:
those who have nothing worthwhile to offer because they have no assets
are unable to earn a decent living. The solution is not to abolish the mar-
ket economy, which was tried in the communist countries for 70 years and
proved a disastrous dead end, but to give the poor access to assets that
will enable them to make and sell things that others will pay to buy. That
means:
• Education. There is no hope unless the poor get more human capi-
tal than they have had in the past. Latin America has made some pro-
gress in improving education in the last decade, but it is still lagging on
a world scale.
* Titling programs to provide property rights to the informal sector
and allow Hernando de Soto's "mystery of capital" to be unlocked (de
Soto 2000).
• Land reform. The Brazilian program of recent years to help peas-
ants buy land from latifundia landlords provides a model. Landlords
do not feel their vital interests to be threatened and therefore they do
not resort to extreme measures to thwart the program. Property rights
are respected. The peasants get opportunities but not handouts, which
seems to be what they want.
* Microcredit. Organizations to supply microcredit are spreading, but
they still serve only about 2 million of Latin America's 200 million
poor. The biggest obstacle to an expanded program consists of the very
high real interest rates that have been common in the region. These
high interest rates mean either that microcredit programs have a sub-
stantial fiscal cost and create an incentive to divert funds to the less
poor (if interest rates are subsidized), or (otherwise) that they do not
convey much benefit to the borrowers. Macro policy in a number of
countries needs to aim to reduce market interest rates over time, which
will inter alia facilitate the spread of microcredit.
In the best of worlds such policies will take time to produce a social
revolution, for the very basic reason that they rely on the creation of new
assets, and it takes time to produce new assets. But, unlike populist pro-
grams, they do have the potential to produce a real social revolution if
they are pursued steadfastly. And they could do so without undermining
the wellbeing of the rich, thus holding out the hope that these tradition-
ally fragmented societies might finally begin to develop real social
cohesion.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Some may ask whether it matters whether people declare themselves
for or against the Washington Consensus. If the battles are essentially
semantic, why don't we all jump on its grave and get on with the serious
work of pursuing an updated policy agenda? Good question, but perhaps
there is a serious answer. When a serious economist attacks the Washing-
ton Consensus, the world at large interprets that as saying that he be-
lieves there is a serious intellectual case against disciplined
macroeconomic policies, the use of markets, and trade liberalization-the
three core ideas that were embodied in the original list and that are iden-
tified with the IFIs. Perhaps there is such a case, but I have not found it
argued in Stiglitz (2002) or anywhere else. If the term is being used as a
pseudonym for market fundamentalism, then the public read into it a
declaration that the IFIs are committed to market fundamentalism. That
is a caricature. We have no business to be propagating caricatures.
Everyone agrees that the Washington Consensus did not contain all the
answers to the questions of 1989, let alone that it addresses all the new
issues that have arisen since then. So of course we need to go beyond it.
That is the purpose of this conference, to which I hope the penultimate
section of this paper will contribute.
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